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Firms’ experience of SME-friendly policy and their participation and success in 
public procurement  
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between firms’ 
experience of SME-friendly policy and their participation and success in public 
procurement.    
Methodology – Hypothesised relationships between SME-friendly policy and three 
outcome variables - frequency of tendering, success rate in public contract 
competitions, and commercial orientation towards the public sector - are tested using 
survey data from 2755 SME respondents.     
Findings – SME-friendly policy is found to be significant in explaining success rates 
and commercial orientation towards the public sector marketplace. It is not significant 
in explaining frequency of tendering.  
Originality – This study puts forward and tests an original model of SME-friendly 
procurement policy and its associated outcomes for firms. It develops a comprehensive 
16-item instrument to measure SME-friendly procurement policy. It uses SMEs as 
research informants instead of public buyers. 
Limitations – The context for the study is Ireland. However, given institutional 
similarities in national public procurement regimes, particularly among EU Member 
States, the findings have relevance beyond the Irish context. The research design is 
cross-sectional and so does not allow for any causal claims to be made.     
Keywords SMEs, public procurement, policy, tendering, contracts. 
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction  
Small and medium-size enterprise (SME) involvement in the marketplace for public 
sector contracts is an area that pre-occupies policy makers and elected representatives 
in the EU, the US, and beyond. The reason for this is simple. All the evidence shows 
that SMEs struggle to compete in public tendering competitions and are under-
represented as public sector suppliers (Cabinet Office, 2013; GHK, 2010; PwC, 2014). 
Without doubt, something akin to market failure exists. This is neither desirable nor 
tenable if governments are serious about fostering dynamic economies with SMEs as 
the engines of growth, innovation and employment creation (Glover, 2008; Preuss, 
2011; Sorte Junior, 2016). Accounting for, on average, 12.8 per cent of GDP and 29 
per cent of total government expenditure across developed economies, the public 
procurement market is too commercially important for SMEs to be excluded from 
(OECD, 2013). Not only does SMEs’ under-representation limit their growth 
prospects and opportunities for diversifying their customer base, it also means that the 
supply marketplace is not as competitive as it could be (European Commission, 2008). 
Public sector organisations lose out as a result, with repercussions for efficiency in 
public administration and the effective delivery of public services.  
 
There is no single cause of SMEs’ experienced difficulties in public procurement. 
Rather, myriad environmental, procedural and organisational factors combine to 
stymie their involvement and chances of success (Loader, 2013). Many of the 
problems are systemic, however, which is why governments feel impelled to take 
corrective action. This has resulted in the introduction of SME-friendly procurement 
policies at national and supranational levels; for example, the European Code of Best 
Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (European 
Commission, 2008). As the title implies, it and equivalent policies found outside the 
EU are designed to make it simpler for SMEs to access and then compete for public 
sector contracts. For all the attention surrounding them, surprisingly little is known 
regarding the effectiveness of these policies in meeting their stated aims. In particular, 
questions over whether they lead SMEs to tender more often and win more contracts 
have gone largely unanswered. A recent exception is Reis and Cabral (2015). Their 
investigation of procurement preference programmes in Brazil found that SMEs 
benefited as a result of this type of intervention, measured by their involvement and 
success rates in contract competitions. Apart from preference programmes, which are 
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disallowed in EU Member States, it remains to be seen what impact policy is having. 
This represents a significant research gap.  
 
Several reasons explain why research on this topic has not been more forthcoming. 
Inadequate oversight and management of SME-friendly procurement policy is one. 
While the majority of OECD countries have taken steps to assist SMEs in public 
procurement, only a minority actively monitor and evaluate their policies (OECD, 
2013). A related issue is that government objectives for SMEs in public procurement 
can lack specificity, which does not lend itself to conducting policy assessments 
(Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). Difficulty in securing survey access to populations 
of public buyers and SME suppliers is another contributory factor. Allowance must 
also be made for the fact that public procurement is a relatively new field of academic 
inquiry (Snider and Rendon, 2008). Procurement-related research has also tended to 
prioritise large firms over SMEs (Morrissey and Pittaway, 2004). Finally, researchers 
may be guilty of assuming that policy automatically translates into practice and 
delivers on its promises as those who formulated it envisaged. Yet as Murray (2012) 
asserted in a recent critique of public procurement reforms in the UK, just because 
elected representatives say change will happen does not mean it will. To paraphrase 
Bennett (2008), creating a SME-friendly enterprise environment is easier said than 
done.  
The aim of this study is to shed light on SME-friendly procurement policy as it is 
playing out in practice. It does so by investigating firms’ reported experience of policy 
and how this, in turn, is related to their participation and success in public contract 
competitions. While the context for the investigation is Ireland, the relevance of the 
findings extends much further owing to similarities in regulatory-policy frameworks 
governing public procurement across developed economies (see, for example, OECD, 
2013). This is especially true in the EU where the European Commission acts as the 
primary institutional rule setter in the public procurement field for all Member States. 
The paper is organised into five sections. The first section discusses SMEs’ under-
representation as public sector suppliers and the policy actions governments are taking 
to redress this imbalance. The second section sets out a hypothetico-deductive model 
to be tested. The third section describes a survey-based, cross-sectional research 
design. The fourth section reports the empirical findings. The final section discusses 
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the contribution of the study to scholarship as well as its implications for practice. It 
concludes with acknowledgement of the study’s limitations and recommendations for 
how this line of inquiry can be taken forward.   
Literature review  
Public procurement is understood as having a key role to play in supporting the SME 
sector specifically and, at a more overarching level, fostering a dynamic enterprise 
environment (Preuss, 2011; Sorte Junior, 2016). Contemporary enterprise policy bears 
this out, with procurement featuring prominently as a policy lever in both the EU Small 
Business Act 2008 and the US Small Business Act. In concrete terms, public sector 
contracts offer SMEs stable and predictable sources of demand, payment certainty and 
reputational enhancement (Cabras, 2011; Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2005); all of which 
enables them to build for the future by investing in their organisational resources and 
human capital. Interacting with the public sector can also spur SMEs to professionalise 
their operations (Pickernell et al., 2013b) and engage in product and process 
innovation (Georghiou et al., 2014). Nor are the benefits one-way. SME involvement 
adds to the quantity and quality of competition in the supply marketplace, yielding 
lower bid prices and improved choice for public sector organisations (European 
Commission, 2008). Equally, it serves the goal of having a sustainable domestic 
business sector that creates employment, embeds itself in the local economy and 
contributes to national prosperity.   
In highlighting its role in supporting SMEs, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
securing goods and services at the most economically advantageous terms available 
and in accordance with national law remains the overriding priority in public 
procurement. As research shows, this is ultimately what guides public buyers’ calculus 
(Cabras, 2011; Loader, 2007). With some justification, scholars have argued that 
facilitating SMEs in public procurement is not always feasible when financial 
pressures and legal constraints are taken into account (Erridge and McIllroy, 2002; 
Glover, 2008; Pickernell et al., 2011). To illustrate, one strategy that is increasingly 
being deployed across the public sector is the use of centralised or aggregated 
purchasing, particularly for standardised products and services. While the economies 
of scale from this approach can result in substantial cost savings, process efficiencies, 
and improved public service delivery outcomes (Sorte Junior, 2013), it does come at 
the expense of SME involvement in contract competitions. Using public procurement 
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as a lever for supporting the SME sector is, therefore, not without its own tensions and 
contradictions. In some situations, the public interest may even be better served by 
privileging price and efficiency considerations over the inclusion of small firms.      
SMEs’ difficulties in public procurement 
Stated already, it is in the interests of the purchasing organisation and the economy as 
a whole that SMEs are active in the public contracts marketplace. Against this, SMEs 
are consistently shown to be dissatisfied with the culture and processes of public 
procurement (Loader, 2013) and rate supplying the private sector more favourably 
(Purchase et al., 2009). The available evidence leaves little doubt that SMEs are under-
represented as public sector suppliers. In the first instance, they appear less able or 
willing to compete for public contracts. In a 2012 survey of almost 5000 UK SMEs 
only 10 per cent had bid for a contract in the previous 12 months (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2013). Small firms have also been found to be only 
half as likely as large firms to use the internet to access tender documents or sell to 
public sector organisations (Office for National Statistics, 2012). In terms of success, 
the most recent EU-wide assessment puts SMEs’ share of above-threshold contracts1 
at 29 per cent – only half that of their GDP contribution; although their share of below-
threshold contracts is estimated to be in the region of 58-59 per cent (PwC, 2014). The 
situation is no better at national level. According to the most recent estimates from the 
UK government, only 10.5 per cent of the value of direct public procurement 
expenditure and 9.4 per cent of indirect expenditure goes to SMEs (Cabinet Office, 
2013).   
SME-friendly policy in public procurement 
SMEs’ under-representation in public procurement has led governments to adopt 
policies to remedy the problem. In a recent OECD assessment, 29 of 32 countries 
surveyed had instituted reforms to better facilitate SMEs in tendering, and 11 of these 
had enacted policies or made specific legislative provisions (OECD, 2013). In the EU 
equality of opportunity for SMEs in public procurement, rather than equality of 
outcome, serves as the guiding principle; and all EU Member States are legally bound 
                                                          
1 ͚Aďoǀe-threshold ĐontraĐts͛ refer to Supplies and SerǀiĐes ĐontraĐts ǀalued at €134,000 (or €207,000 
for public sector entities other than central government) and Works contracts valued at €5,186,000. 
Such contracts must be advertised in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) and procured 
in accordance with EU Procurement Directives. 
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by it under Directive 2014/24/EU. EU procurement policy is targeted at levelling the 
playing field for SMEs, leading to a more inclusive and competitive marketplace. 
Primarily, this involves tackling the barriers that inhibit SMEs from competing for 
public contracts in the first place (European Commission, 2008). By contrast, the US 
and non-EU countries tend to employ a mix of facilitative policy measures as well as 
preference programmes and set-asides for domestic SMEs (Kidalov and Snider, 2011; 
Reis and Cabral, 2015). Thus, in addition to taking steps to facilitate SME 
involvement, they also resort to forms of ‘positive discrimination’ that guarantee 
SMEs a share of public contracts. In this study the focus is on facilitative, non-
discriminatory policy measures. A detailed account of how these can promote SME 
participation and success in public procurement is set out in the next section.  
 
Model development 
The model presented in this section posits relationships between SME-friendly policy, 
as experienced by SMEs themselves, and (i) frequency of tendering (ii) success rate 
in contract competitions and (iii) commercial orientation towards the public sector (see 
Figure I). The relationships are predicated on what policy explicitly sets out to achieve, 
which is to have more SMEs competing for and winning public sector contracts. There 
is an outstanding need for reliable, survey-based evidence on SME-friendly 
procurement policy and its associated outcomes for firms; hence the rationale for the 
deductive model put forward here.  
 
SME-friendly policy and frequency of tendering 
SME-friendly policy contains various measures designed to make it easier for small 
firms to tender for public sector contracts. First among these is getting buyers to 
publicly advertise current and future supply opportunities on designated government 
contracts websites. Doing so enables SMEs to search for, identify and respond to 
requests for tender or quotation quickly and efficiently. This is important as lack of 
awareness over contract opportunities can prevent SMEs from getting involved in 
public procurement (Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2005; Ringwald et al., 2009). Allied to 
open advertising of public contracts is the need for proactivity and professionalism on 
the part of buyers in researching their marketplace and engaging with suppliers 
(Cabras, 2011; Georghiou et al., 2014). Such actions put public contracts on the radar 
of smaller and newer firms and stimulate their interest in competing for them. 
7 
 
Reducing the administrative burden and transaction costs involved in preparing and 
submitting a bid is also a universal theme of SME-friendly policy. The transaction 
costs of tendering can be prohibitive to small firms, averaging £3200 in the EU and 
£5800 in the UK for a routine contract (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 
2013). Measures to reduce these costs, whether in the form of buyers using standard 
tender documentation, enabling the e-submission of tenders, or allowing applicants to 
self-declare their financial capacity and insurance cover should increase SMEs’ 
willingness to tender.  
The average size of public contracts is known to pose challenges for firms that have 
limited organisational capacity and human resource availability (GHK, 2010; Loader, 
2013). SME-friendly policy advocates steps that buyers should take to tackle this 
particular barrier. These include dividing contracts into lots, facilitating consortium 
bidding, and making framework agreements inclusive of small suppliers. By acting on 
these measures buyers create business opportunities for SMEs that were previously 
beyond their capacity. Proportionality in the use of qualification criteria, particularly 
around financial capacity and insurance cover requirements, is also deemed to be a 
determinant of whether small firms get to compete for public contracts (Ringwald et 
al., 2009). Where qualification criteria are applied in a proportionate manner small 
firms are, at the very least, not precluded from tendering. Other measures, such as the 
provision of feedback on failed tenders, provide valuable learning points and insights 
for inexperienced firms and reduce their levels of uncertainty (Flynn et al., 2013; 
Ramsden and Bennett, 2005). Advice of this kind may be the difference between firms 
persisting with public sector tendering or quitting altogether. Overall, to the extent that 
firms experience SME-friendly policy support measures, they should feel able and 
willing to tender for public sector contracts. This gives the following hypothesis:  
H1 SMEs’ experience of policy support measures is positively associated with 
frequency of tendering.  
SME-friendly policy and success rate in public contract competitions 
As well as enabling SMEs to tender more often, policy support measures can bolster 
their probability of success in contract competitions. Principally, this is because SME-
friendly policy helps to ‘level the playing field’ in public procurement and ensures that 
its practices and procedures do not unduly disadvantage smaller and younger suppliers 
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(Kidalov and Snider, 2011; Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). Given the chance to 
compete, there is reason to believe that SMEs will acquit themselves ably. For a start, 
they are well placed to offer competitive pricing arrangements on account of their 
minimal administrative overheads and streamlined operations (NERA Economic 
Consulting, 2005). This is advantageous as cost is a key criterion for public buyers 
when deciding on choice of supplier. Moreover, public buyers are under increasing 
pressure to realise best value for money (BVM) across the supply chain (Dimitri, 
2013). Apart from competitive pricing, many SMEs possess the niche skills, 
innovativeness and versatility that large purchasing organisations prize in their 
suppliers (Woldesenbat et al., 2011). Public buyers are on record as acknowledging 
this to be the case (Loader, 2007). Coupled with these attributes is SMEs’ reputation 
for ‘going the extra mile’ to satisfy customer needs (NERA Economic Consulting, 
2005) and their proven ability to generate economic value-added for large 
organisations (Ngugi et al., 2010). Summarising, SMEs can be genuine contenders for 
public contracts provided they are given the opportunity to compete. SME-friendly 
policy measures are designed to give them every practical opportunity to compete. 
This gives the following hypothesis: 
 
H2 SMEs’ experience of policy support measures is positively associated with success 
rate in public contract competitions.  
SME-friendly policy and commercial orientation towards the public sector  
The third hypothesised relationship is between SME-friendly policy and commercial 
orientation towards the public sector. The rationale for this proposed relationship is as 
follows. SME-friendly policy measures are designed to facilitate smaller and younger 
firms to compete for public sector contracts (Department of Finance, 2010). Such 
measures, if acted on by public buyers, widen SME access to contract competitions, 
ensure that eligibility and evaluation criteria are proportionate to the nature of the 
contract, reduce the transaction costs of compiling a tender, and match supply 
requirements to the organisational capacity of smaller firms where at all feasible 
(Flynn and Davis, 2015). Taken together, this should help to tackle the systemic bias 
in favour of large firms and re-balance the competitive landscape in public 
procurement (Anglund, 1999). From this, public contracting should become relatively 
more attractive for SMEs and even rival supply opportunities in the private sector; 
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something which is currently not the case (Purchase et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
projected cost-benefit ratio of competing for public contracts should become more 
favourable for SMEs (Flynn and Davis, 2016). The anticipated effect of this 
improvement in circumstances is that SMEs will allocate more of their time, resources 
and strategic planning activity to competing for and winning public contracts. In other 
words, they will develop a greater commercial orientation towards the public sector 
marketplace; evident, for example, in the proportion of their revenue attributable to 
contracting with public sector organisations. This gives the following hypothesis: 
 
H3 SMEs’ experience of policy support measures is positively associated with 
commercial orientation towards the public sector.  
 
Figure I. SME-friendly procurement policy and associated outcomes  
 
 
Methodology  
Independent variable  
The independent variable in this study is firms’ experience of SME-friendly policy in 
public procurement. To measure it firms were asked if it is their experience that SME-
friendly policy is being acted on by public buyers. Measurement is in binary terms: 
yes/no. Hoejmose et al. (2013) adopted the same stance when investigating the 
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implementation of sustainable procurement policies, albeit with buyers as survey 
respondents. A total of 16 SME-friendly policy measures are captured in this way. 
These are taken from Irish government policy, which is discussed in more detail under 
the sub-section, Research context. The 16 policy recommendations are listed in Table 
I. They correspond to six areas that are universally germane to facilitating SME 
participation in public procurement (i) improving contract visibility (ii) alleviating the 
administrative burden of tendering (iii) tackling the mismatch between contract size 
and SMEs’ organisational capacity (iv) ensuring qualification and assessment criteria 
are proportionate to the nature of the contract (v) displaying openness to new suppliers 
and supply solutions and (vi) reducing SMEs’ information deficit in public 
procurement.  
Firms’ reported experience of each of the 16 policy measures is also included in Table 
I. From the perspective of SMEs, some measures are being put into practice more than 
others. Measures to alleviate the administrative burden associated with tendering are 
reported on positively. To illustrate, 72 per cent agree that public buyers promote the 
online submission of tenders and 67 per cent agree that public buyers use standardised 
tender documentation and templates. By contrast, respondents are negative in their 
assessment of measures concerning a more open attitude to contracting with new 
suppliers. Less than 30 per cent believe that public buyers engage with the supply 
marketplace prior to issuing a formal request for tender and only 38 per cent had 
experience of public buyers being willing to accept reasonable variants to tender 
specifications. Similar negative assessments are made in respect of tackling contract 
size barriers and narrowing SMEs’ information deficit. For instance, only 34 per cent 
agree that public buyers devise framework agreements with SMEs in mind while only 
38 per cent believe that written feedback for unsuccessful tenderers is provided as a 
matter of routine.  
<Insert Table I here> 
The 16 measures are summed to create a composite variable of each firm’s experience 
of SME-friendly policy. Reported experience of a policy measure is given a value of 
1. Non-experience is given a value of 0. All 16 policy measures are weighted equally. 
This produces a 0-16 scale. The mean score on this scale is 7.97 (std. dev. 3.95). The 
median score is 8. The minimum score is 0 and the maximum score is 16. A breakdown 
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of respondents’ scores is provided in Table II. It shows wide variation in their  reported 
experiences. Approximately 2.3 per cent claim that they have not experienced any of 
the 16 SME-friendly policy measures. Many more report either a low (18.2 per cent) 
or low-moderate (36 per cent) experience of SME-friendly policy. Against this, 28.9 
per cent can be classed as having a moderate-high experience of SME-friendly policy, 
10.9 per cent having a high experience, and 3.7 having experienced all 16 
recommendations. The distribution of scores is positively skewed (z = 2.84), 
signifying a clustering of firms towards the low-moderate range of the scale (see 
Figure II). As asserted earlier, exposure to SME-friendly policy is expected to be 
linked to SME participation and success in public contract competitions. These 
outcome variables are discussed next.   
<Insert Table II here> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II. Distribution of scores for firms on the SME-friendly policy scale 
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Outcome variables  
There are three outcome variables in this study. These are (i) frequency of tendering 
(ii) success rate in public contract competitions and (iii) commercial orientation 
towards the public sector (see Table III). Similar outcomes variables have been used 
in recent investigations into SME participation in public contracting (Flynn and Davis, 
2016; Flynn et al., 2015; Reijonen et al., 2014). Here frequency of tendering is 
measured as the total number of public sector tenders that a SME submitted throughout 
2014. Success rate is measured as the percentage of public contracts tendered for in 
2014 that a SME succeeded in winning. Lastly, commercial orientation towards the 
public sector is measured in terms of the proportion of total revenue that came from 
public contracting over the course of 2014.   
Controls 
Five organisation characteristics are controlled for in this study. These are (i) firm size 
(ii) firm age (iii) sector (iv) tendering experience and (v) human resource availability 
for tendering. Their measurement, operationalisation and statistical descriptors are 
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also included in Table III. Firm size is controlled for as research shows that larger 
firms tender more often and enjoy higher success rates in public contract competitions 
(Flynn and Davis, 2016; Flynn et al., 2015; GHK, 2010; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 
2008; Temponi and Cui, 2008). Firm size is approximated by number of employees. 
In line with EU classification standards, three size ranges are used for measurement 
purposes: 1-9 employees (micro); 10-49 employees (small); 50-249 employees 
(medium). The second control variable is age. Evidence adduced by Pickernell et al. 
(2013a) and Reijonen et al. (2014) suggests that established firms are more active in 
the public sector marketplace. Age is measured as the number of years a firm has been 
trading. Sectoral effects have also been linked to SME participation and success in 
public procurement (Pickernell et al., 2011; PwC, 2014). Sector is measured by 
reference to four categories: construction; manufacturing; services; and other 
industries. Tendering experience is believed to support firms in identifying, competing 
for and winning public contracts. It is measured on a scale of 1-100 years. The last 
control variable is human resource availability for tendering. Studies show that human 
resource availability determines a firm’s ability to respond to growth opportunities 
generally (Matlay, 2000) and public sector opportunities specifically (Karjalainen and 
Kemppainen, 2008). It is measured as the number of employees ordinarily involved in 
compiling a tender.     
 
<Insert Table III here> 
Research context 
The Irish marketplace for public sector contracts serves as the research context. As 
with other EU Member States and OECD countries, Ireland has enacted policies and 
embarked on initiatives over the last number of years to promote SME involvement in 
public procurement. In 2010 these were brought together under a single policy 
guidance document entitled Facilitating SME Access to Public Procurement 
(Department of Finance, 2010). It sets out a series of ‘positive measures’ that all public 
sector employees with responsibility for procurement are obliged to follow. The 16 
policy measures under investigation in this study constitute the sum total of these 
‘positive measures’. Facilitating SME Access to Public Procurement applies to every 
level and category of the public sector, including local government, central 
government, state agencies, semi-state and utility companies, hospitals, schools and 
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universities. While public buyers are required to act on the policy set forth, they must 
still ensure that ‘public sector purchasing is carried out in a manner that is legal, 
transparent, and secures optimal value for money for the taxpayer’ (Department of 
Finance, 2010, p. 1). SME-friendly policy, while important, does not take precedence 
over the existing body of laws and guidelines governing public purchasing.  
SME-friendly procurement policy in Ireland is derived from EU policy in this area, 
namely: the European Code of Best Practice Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public 
Procurement Contracts (European Commission, 2008). As well, the degree to which 
Ireland or any EU Member State can assist SMEs in public procurement is bounded 
by EC Procurement Directives guaranteeing free and fair competition. In this way, the 
policy and regulatory regime in Ireland as it concerns SMEs and public sector 
tendering is almost identical to that which obtains throughout the EU. The coercive 
and normative power of the European Commission has made it so that public 
procurement systems in EU Member States are becoming isomorphic with one 
another. Excepting preference programmes, the procurement policy environment in 
Ireland also resembles that of developed economies outside the EU. In essence, Irish 
policy efforts to facilitate SMEs in public contract competitions are comparable to 
other developed economies, especially EU Member States. This is crucial as it means 
that the findings to emerge from this study have relevance beyond the Irish context.       
Research informants  
SMEs are the research informants in this study. As a corollary, SME-friendly policy 
is rendered through SMEs’ awareness and perceptions of the specific actions public 
buyers are taking to create a ‘level playing field’, rather than the prevalence of the 
measures per se. The selection of SMEs is apposite given their under-utilisation as 
informants in procurement research compared to public buyers (Murray, 2009). As the 
intended beneficiaries of these policies, it is important that their experiences are voiced 
and put on record. Like comparable studies in the field (Flynn and Davis, 2015; 
Murray, 2011), self-reporting was the preferred method for data collection. It has the 
advantage of being resource efficient and it guarantees respondent anonymity. Self-
reporting does come with certain caveats, including the possibility of social 
desirability bias and inaccurate answering. That said, Chan’s (2009) comprehensive 
review of the evidence on self-reporting in surveys concluded that it is not inherently 
flawed or that the criticisms made of it do not equally apply to ostensibly objective 
15 
 
data collection techniques. Finally, it is important to point out that all data was 
gathered from respondents at a single point in time. By implication, no claim can be 
made as to the causative effect of SME-friendly policy on SME behaviour and 
outcomes in public contract competitions.     
Sampling strategy 
In January 2015 what amounted to a population-wide survey of firms competing for 
business with the Irish public sector was undertaken. Contact was made via email with 
the 60,0002 firms registered on e-Tenders - the Irish government-managed website 
which advertises public contracts. Almost all firms interested in contracting with the 
Irish public sector are registered on e-Tenders. This can be explained as follows. First, 
registration on e-Tenders is essential if firms want to access tender-related 
documentation and submit bids electronically. Second, all public sector contracts in 
Ireland subject to open competition are listed on e-Tenders. The net effect is that the 
majority of firms involved in the public procurement market in Ireland are registered 
on e-Tenders. Admittedly, e-Tenders is unlikely to cover the entire population as a 
small minority of firms, particularly micro-enterprises and sole traders, can service 
low value public contracts without having to register on it. As a result, these types of 
firms may be under-represented in the respondent cohort. This proviso has to be borne 
in mind when interpreting the results and generalising to the SME supplier population. 
Prior to its distribution, and in line with recommended practice (Dillman, 2007), the 
survey instrument was pre-tested with ten SMEs and reviewed by officials in Ireland’s 
Office of Government Procurement (OGP) for its user-friendliness and accuracy. 
Based on their advice, some minor adjustments were made to question phrasing and 
response choices.  
Data screening  
The survey period lasted 14 days. A total of 4743 responses were received, giving a 
response rate of 8 per cent. The data was screened prior to conducting inferential 
statistical tests. Given the SME-focus of the study, large firms – firms employing 250 
or more employees – had to be removed from the dataset. This resulted in the 
elimination of 530 cases. Thereafter, substantially incomplete responses were 
identified. A response was taken to be incomplete if it did not progress beyond the 
                                                          
2 Source: Office of Government Procurement (OGP), Ireland.   
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first e-page of the questionnaire. This resulted in the elimination of a further 1458 
cases. The final number of usable SME responses is 2755. To test for 
representativeness we compared the characteristics of early and late respondents3 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Comparisons were made across firm size, age, 
revenue, tendering experience, human resource availability for tendering and 
frequency of tendering. Independent sample t-tests confirmed that there is no 
statistically significant difference between early and late respondents on any of the 
variables except for age (p <.05). This instils confidence that respondent firms are 
broadly representative of the population sample. 
Description of respondents 
The profile of respondent SMEs is as follows. Approximately 58 per cent are classed 
as micro-enterprises, 28 per cent are classed as small enterprises, and 14 per cent are 
classed as medium-sized enterprises. Just over 62 per cent have been in business for 
11 years or more, while the remaining 38 per cent are not older than 10 years. In terms 
of sector, 52 per cent are in the services sector (professional, consultancy and retail), 
19 per cent are in the construction sector, 10 per cent are in the manufacturing sector 
and the remainder belong to other sectors. SMEs have an average of 12 years tendering 
experience. The mean number of employees typically involved in compiling a tender 
is 2.52. Statistical descriptors for SME behaviour and outcomes in tendering reveal 
that the average number of contracts tendered for in 2014 was 9.10, the average win 
rate in contract competitions was 26 per cent and public contracts as a percentage of 
revenue averaged 24 per cent. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that there are statistically 
significant differences in the reported experience of SME-friendly policy among 
sector and size groups (p <.01). SMEs in manufacturing and all other sectors report 
higher scores than firms in services and construction: 8.72 and 8.56 versus 7.73 and 
7.63 respectively, on the 0-16 scale. Firm size and experience of SME-friendly policy 
are also correlated, with larger SMEs reporting higher scores. All statistical descriptors 
are provided in Table III.  
                                                          
3 The early respondent group comprised the first 100 firms to submit their questionnaires. Their 
responses were received within 3 hours of the surǀey͛s distriďution. The late respondent group ǁas 
made up of the final 100 firms to submit their questionnaire. Their responses were received 10 days 
after contact was initially made, and then only after a reminder notification had been issued. 
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Results 
This section presents the results of the study. Each of the three hypothesised 
relationships is tested using step-wise regression. The five control variables are 
entered in the first step. The variable that captures firms’ experience of SME-friendly 
policy is entered second. This is done in respect of frequency of tendering (Model 1), 
success rate in public contract competitions (Model 2) and commercial orientation 
towards the public sector (Model 3). The output from these three models is given 
below. Table IV contains the standardised coefficients (β), standard errors and 
significance values for the independent and control variables in the case of Models 1-
3. Before proceeding, it is important to point out that there is no evidence of multi-
collinearity in the dataset. Proof of this, the highest observed Value Inflation Factor 
(VIF) value is 1.504. 
The first variable tested is frequency of tendering, measured as the number of contracts 
tendered for by SMEs throughout 2014 (Model 1). H1 states that firms’ experience of 
SME-friendly policy is positively associated with frequency of tendering. At the first 
step, the controls account for 21 per cent of the variance. Firm size, tendering 
experience and human resource availability are positively related to frequency of 
tendering. Sector is also important. The construction sector is significant and positive 
while the manufacturing sector is significant and negative. Firm age is not significant. 
At the second step, the SME-friendly policy variable is entered into the model. It is 
not found to be significant in respect of frequency of tendering (p =.62) and even has 
a negative β value. This means that H1 is rejected.  
The second variable tested is success rate in public contract competitions, measured 
as SMEs’ contract win-ratio for 2014 (Model 2). H2 states that firms’ experience of 
SME-friendly policy is positively associated with success rate. At the first step, firm 
size, tendering experience and human resource availability are significant. The 
construction sector is again significant, although this time the relationship is negative. 
Firm age is not significant. Together the controls account for 3 per cent of the variance 
in this outcome variable. At the second step, the SME-friendly policy variable is 
entered into the model. It emerges as significant (p <.01). Indicated by a β value of 
.17, its effect surpasses that of any of the control variables. The variance explained or 
                                                          
4 VIF scores over 10 point to a multicollinearity problem.  
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Adjusted R2 increases from 3 per cent at step one to 6 per cent at step two. These 
findings lead to acceptance of H2.           
The third and final outcome variable tested concerns SMEs’ commercial orientation 
towards the public sector, measured as the proportion of revenue attributable to public 
contracting in 2014 (Model 3). H3 states that firms’ experience of SME-friendly policy 
is positively associated with commercial orientation towards the public sector. At step 
one, tendering experience and human resource availability are positively related to 
commercial orientation. Sector is also relevant. The relationship is significant and 
positive in the case of the construction sector and significant and negative in the case 
of the manufacturing. Firm age is significant but negative. Firm size is not significant. 
At step two, the SME-friendly policy variable is found to be significant (p <.01). The 
magnitude of its effect (β =.11) is second only to that of tendering experience. 
Adjusted R2 increases from 4 per cent to 5 per cent resulting from the inclusion of this 
variable in Model 3. On the basis of the above H3 is accepted.  
While not specified in the model, interactions between the three outcome variables are 
also examined. Analysis shows that frequency of tendering and success rate in contract 
competitions explain 25 per cent of the variance in commercial orientation towards 
the public sector market. Both are significant at p <.01. The size effect of success rate 
(β = .37) is larger than frequency of tendering (β = .29). The overall inference is that 
frequency of tendering and success rate in contract competitions are themselves 
antecedents of a firm’s presence in and orientation towards the public sector 
marketplace. 
The findings presented above lead to the following conclusions. Experience of SME-
friendly policy is not linked to number of tenders submitted. By contrast, it is 
associated with success rate in contract competitions and the degree to which SMEs 
are commercially oriented towards the public sector marketplace. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that policy interventions create the conditions under 
which SMEs are more likely to become suppliers to public sector organisations. It also 
offers some vindication of prevailing SME-friendly policy initiatives. At the same 
time, the findings point up the limits to what policy measures, at least those that stop 
short of discriminating in favour of SMEs, can be expected to achieve. SME-friendly 
policy is clearly not a panacea for the under-representation of small firms in public 
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procurement and only accounts for a small percentage variation in their success rates 
and orientation towards the public sector marketplace. For both scholars and 
practitioners, the findings raise interesting points for debate. These are discussed next.      
 
  <Insert Table IV here> 
Discussion  
Policies to expand SMEs’ presence in public procurement are a common feature of 
contemporary public administration (OECD, 2013). These policies evince similarities 
in content, with their emphasis on increasing the visibility of opportunities, ensuring 
relevancy and proportionality in the use of qualification criteria, alleviating the 
administrative burden of tendering, tackling contract size barriers and addressing 
information deficits, among other areas. Such trends reflect the fact that SMEs are 
under-represented as public sector suppliers at national and international level 
(Cabinet Office, 2013; GHK, 2010; PwC, 2014) and report the same barriers when 
competing for public contracts irrespective of jurisdiction (Loader, 2013). While 
academic interest in SME-friendly procurement policy is gaining pace, there remains 
a paucity of empirical studies. With a few exceptions (Flynn and Davis, 2015; Murray, 
2011; Reis and Cabral, 2015), we know very little about the implementation of SME-
friendly policies or their effects for firms in practice. Hence, the findings adduced in 
this study represent a timely and warranted addition to the literature. On the one hand, 
they afford SME and public procurement scholars a more evidence-informed view of 
government attempts to re-balance the market for public sector contracts. Equally, they 
provide some indication of how procurement reform initiatives are being experienced 
by SMEs as well as their association with indicators of firm behaviour and 
performance.  
A central objective of procurement policy is to maximise SME participation in 
contract competitions (European Commission, 2008). Within this context it is notable 
that our findings do not return any support for the hypothesised relationship between 
experience of SME-friendly policy and frequency of tendering. Contrary to 
expectations, firms who report high incidence of SME-friendly policy do not, on 
average, tender more frequently than firms who report low incidence. Considering that 
policy is intended to remove access and procedural obstacles believed to stymie 
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SMEs’ willingness and ability to compete (Kidalov and Snider, 2011), this finding is 
surprising. One explanation is that SMEs are exhibiting a delayed, ‘wait-and-see’ 
response to the roll-out of policy designed to benefit them. Extra time might be needed 
before they feel confident of diverting more of their already scarce resources to 
pursuing opportunities with public sector organisations. Another is that policy 
measures are less impactful than is commonly assumed in stimulating SMEs to tender. 
On their own they might not be enough to alter SMEs’ tendering intentions, as resource 
limitations and/or commitments to private sector customers remain deterministic of 
organisational behaviour. Research design issues may also be playing a part. The 
approach taken in this study is to treat SME-friendly policy as a composite variable 
comprising 16 individual measures. The nuances of SME-friendly policy and its 
relationship to tendering frequency are possibly obscured as a result.    
While experience of SME-friendly policy is not linked with tendering frequency, it is 
linked with two other outcomes: success rates and commercial orientation towards the 
public sector. In respect of the first of these, the findings are consistent with the 
position that providing SMEs with maximum practical opportunity to compete 
increases their likelihood of success. Given the chance to compete, SMEs possess the 
niche skills, customer responsiveness, operational flexibility and ability to offer value 
for money over the long-term to make themselves contenders, even when up against 
incumbents (Loader, 2007; Ngugi et al., 2010; Woldesenbat et al., 2011). SMEs 
themselves have argued this very point, stating their desire only to be able to compete 
on equal terms with large firms (Glover, 2008). In respect of the second variable, the 
findings imply that procurement reform initiatives are associated with SMEs 
establishing a commercial presence in the public sector marketplace. Admittedly, the 
variance explained by SME-friendly policy in respect of these two outcomes is 
relatively small: 6 per cent in the case of success rates and 5 per cent in the case of 
commercial orientation, after controlling for organisation characteristics. Nonetheless, 
the findings demonstrate that the extent to which firms experience SME-friendly 
policy measures is statistically significant in accounting for their success and 
commercial involvement in public procurement.  
Apart from its scholarly contribution, this study offers important lessons for practice. 
In the first instance, it highlights the need for a concerted effort on the part of public 
sector organisations and their procurement personnel to implement SME-friendly 
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policy. Based on the reported experience of firms, policy has only partially translated 
into practice. Notably, this assessment is broadly consistent with public buyers’ self-
reported behaviour, recently documented by Flynn and Davis (2015). It reveals the 
selective implementation of SME-friendly policy recommendations on their part. Yet 
as policy implementers, the onus is on public buyers to fully translate SME-friendly 
policy recommendations into everyday procurement practice and ensure that it 
becomes part of the institutional ‘rules of the game’. What is more, they must be seen 
to be doing so by the business community. The net effect should be a public 
procurement environment in which SMEs are in a position to win more contracts and 
feel incentivised to shift more of their commercial operation into supplying public 
sector organisations. SMEs and their representative associations need to be doing 
everything in their power to effect the realisation of policy. It is in SMEs’ own interests 
to maintain familiarity with the details of policy initiatives – a case of knowing their 
rights – and subsequently holding public sector organisations to account over the 
implementation of these same initiatives.   
Limitations 
The contribution of this study notwithstanding, it does have limitations. First, the study 
was carried out in a single country. Replicating the study in other jurisdictions is 
recommended as it would allow for direct comparisons to be made on SME-friendly 
procurement policy and its associated outcomes for firms. Second, SME-friendly 
policy was tested four-and-a-half years after its initial adoption. While this would seem 
an adequate interval period, it may be that more time is required before its enabling 
effects fully filter through to everyday procurement practices and, thence, to SME 
behaviour and success (Flynn and Davis, 2015). Therefore, re-testing policy impacts 
in the coming years and matching the results with those presented here is advised. 
Third, our cross-sectional research design rules out the possibility of claiming causal 
effects between firms’ experience of policy and their tendering frequency, success 
rates and orientation towards the public sector marketplace. Future research should 
consider initiating longitudinal research designs in which a sample of SMEs active in 
public procurement is surveyed periodically. Fourth, SME-friendly policy is 
understood here from the supplier perspective only. It would be instructive to examine 
the relationship between policy implementation and SME outcomes using public 
buyers as informants. Finally, this study does not explicate the precise mechanisms 
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through which policy shapes firms’ attitudes and behaviours. The use of qualitative 
research designs, including interviews, observation and document analysis, can 
address this shortcoming. Previous case study work by Loader (2005, 2007) indicates 
the possibilities in this regard. 
Conclusion  
This study sheds new light on SME-friendly procurement policy in practice. Its 
findings reveal that experience of SME-friendly measures is not associated with 
increased frequency of tendering activity, but is associated with superior success rates 
in contract competitions and a greater commercial orientation towards the public 
sector. Importantly, exposure to SME-friendly measures is more powerful than 
organisation characteristics, including firm size, sector and tendering experience, in 
accounting for variance in success rates. The study represents among the few 
systematic investigations into SME-friendly policy in a public procurement setting. 
For a variety of reasons, interest surrounding these policies has not been matched by 
evidence on their effects. In this sense, the study begins to fill a knowledge gap and 
brings an element of scientific rigour to the debate that was previously missing. While 
lending empirical weight to the case for SME-friendly policies, the findings signal to 
policy makers, enterprise agencies and business representative groups that further 
action will be required if the under-representation of SMEs as public sector suppliers 
is to be reversed. As a starting point, it is imperative that the policy-practice divide 
currently characterising SME-friendly procurement is closed and that small firms 
receive the full benefit of policies designed to assist them.   
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Table I. SME-friendly policy measures (x 16) and firms’ self-reported experience of them 
Is it your experience that public buyers do the following?                                                                                                                          Yes% 
No%                                                                                                                                                   
Make contract opportunities visible 
1. Advertise contracts for supplies and general services with an estimated value of €25,000 or more on e-Tenders 
2. Communicate long-term purchasing plans to the market by publishing prior information notices (PINs) 
 
61 
45 
 
39 
55 
Alleviate the administrative burden of tendering 
3. Allow applicants to self-declare their financial capacity at the initial phase of the competition 
4. Allow applicants to self-declare their insurance cover at the initial phase of the competition 
5. Use standard documentation and tender templates  
6. Promote the online submission of tenders as the norm 
 
57 
65 
67 
72 
 
43 
35 
33 
28 
Tackle contract size barriers 
7. Divide contracts into lots where appropriate  
8. Show openness to consortium bids by, for example, drawing attention to this possibility in the contract notice  
9. Ensure that the terms of framework agreements facilitate the inclusion of small firms  
 
56 
41 
34 
 
44 
59 
66 
Ensure proportionality in the use of qualification criteria 
10. Do not set company turnover requirements at more than twice the estimated value for routine contracts  
11. Only require types and levels of insurance that are proportionate and reasonable in the context of the contract  
12. Show flexibility over the type of proof of financial capacity accepted  
 
50 
62 
39 
 
50 
38 
61 
Display openness to new suppliers and supply solutions 
13. Undertake market analysis prior to tendering in order to better understand the supply marketplace and what it can offer   
14. Indicate where they are prepared to accept reasonable variants to the specifications of the goods/services sought  
 
28 
38 
 
72 
62 
Address information asymmetries  
15. Provide written feedback as a matter of good practice  
16. Publish all contract award notices over €25,000 on e-Tenders  
 
38 
50 
 
62 
50 
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Table II. Score ranges for respondents on the SME-friendly policy scale 
Score range Label  Respondent % 
0 No experience of SME-friendly policy 2.3 
1-4 Low experience of SME-friendly policy 18.2 
5-8 Low-moderate experience of SME-friendly policy 36 
9-12 Moderate-high experience of SME-friendly policy 28.9 
13-15 High experience of SME-friendly policy 10.9 
16 Complete experience of SME-friendly policy 3.7 
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Table III. Dependent and control variables 
 Variable Operationalisation Measurement Respondent 
characteristics 
Mean score: 
SME-
friendly 
policy 
0-16 scale  
Dependents    
Frequency of tendering  How many public sector contracts did your firm 
tender for in 2014? 
1-100  Mean: 9.10 contracts 
Std. dev.: 15.57 
- 
Success rate in public contract 
competitions 
What percentage of public sector contracts tendered 
for in 2014 did your firm succeed in winning? 
1-100% Mean: 26 per cent 
Std. dev.: 31.57  
- 
Commercial orientation 
towards public sector  
What percentage of your firm’s 2014 revenue came 
from public sector contracts? 
1-100% Mean: 24.72 per 
cent 
Std. dev.: 30.62  
- 
Controls    
Firm size How many employees are there in your firm? 1-9 
10-49 
50-249 
58.2 per cent 
28.1 per cent 
13.7 per cent 
7.38 
8.64 
9.02 
Firm age How many years has your firm been trading? 0-5  
6-10 
11-20 
21+ 
20.7 per cent 
16.9 per cent 
27.2 per cent 
35.2 per cent 
7.71 
7.91 
7.87 
8.21 
Sector Which sector does your firm operate in? Manufacturing 
Services  
Construction 
Other 
9.7 per cent 
52.8 per cent 
19.3 per cent 
18.2 per cent 
8.72 
7.73 
7.63 
8.56 
Tendering experience How many years’ experience does your firm have in 
tendering for public sector contracts? 
1-100  12.17 years 
Std. dev.: 12.56 
- 
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Human resource availability 
for tendering  
How many employees are ordinarily involved in 
preparing a tender on behalf of your firm?  
1-20  2.52 employees 
Std. dev.: 1.98 
- 
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Table IV. Model testing 
 Frequency of tendering Success-rate in competitions Commercial orientation  
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model2b Model 3a Model 3b 
Firm size .24*** (.47) .24*** (.27) .06** (1.07) .04 (1.06) .03 (1.03) .01 (1.03) 
Firm age -.01 (.29) -.01 (.29) -.01 (.65) .00 (.65) -.06** (.63) -.06** (.63)  
Sector: manuf.a -.04** (.97) -.04** (.97) .04 (2.22) .03 (2.20) -.05** (2.12) -.06*** (2.11) 
Sector: constructiona .14*** (.76) .14*** (.76) -.07*** (1.71) -.07*** 
(1.69) 
.05** (1.66) .05** (1.65) 
Sector: all othera  .02 (.76) .01 (.77) .01 (1.74) .00 (1.72) .00 (1.67) -.01 (1.67) 
Tendering experience .26*** (.03) .26*** (.02) .09*** (.06) .08*** (.06) .18*** (.06) .18*** (.06) 
Human resource availability for 
tendering 
.07*** (.17) .07*** (.17) .06** (.38) .05** (.38) .07*** (.37) .06** (.37) 
SME-friendly procurement policy  -.01 (.07)  .17*** (.16)   .11*** (.16) 
n 2430b 2430 2377b 2377 2386b 2386 
Constant -4.58*** 
(.873) 
-4.34*** 
(.99) 
18.47*** 
(1.99) 
9.61*** 
(2.22) 
19.62*** 
(1.91) 
14.17*** 
(2.17)  
F 91.83 80.36 11.24 18.78 15.87 17.48 
Adjusted R2  .21 .21 .03 .06 .04 .05 
***p <.01; **p <.05. The standard error is in parentheses. 
a Sector: services is the referent category.   
b
 Does not equal group total, 2755, due to missing values.  
 
 
 
